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Resumen: La corrupción se puede definir como ―el abuso de la autoridad o confianza pública con 
fines privados‖. Sin embargo, esta definición sugiere que la corrupción es una enfermedad de la 
sociedad  y  no  un  síntoma  resultante  de  problemas  estructurales  como  la  inequidad  o  falta  de 
democracia.  Luego  de  analizar  información  proveniente  de  Freedom  House  y  Transparency 
International,  este  estudio  concluye  que  la  liberalización  económica  y  la  democracia  no  están 
directamente ni linealmente  relacionadas con la corrupción en Suramérica. Otros determinantes 
como la inequidad (política y económica) son esenciales para un análisis integral de la corrupción. 
Adicionalmente, la literatura actual adolece de una definición holística de corrupción que permita 
identificar y entender sus ―verdaderas‖ causas. Al examinar diez países suramericanos durante el 
periodo 1995-2008, el análisis de cointegración de panel de datos sugiere que la corrupción, el 
crecimiento económico y la democracia no están conjuntamente cointegradas ni están relacionadas 
linealmente; hay un eslabón perdido. 
 
 
Abstract: Corruption is defined as ―the abuse of public authority or trust for private  benefit.‖ 
However, this paper argues that this definition frames corruption as a disease of society and not a 
symptom of structural problems such as inequality or lack of democracy. After analyzing data on 
corruption  from  Freedom  House  and  Transparency  International,  this  study  concludes  that 
corruption  is  not  related  to  economic  liberalization  and  democracy  in  a  linear  fashion.  Other 
determinants such as inequality (political and economical) are lacking in the analysis of corruption. 
Additionally, the literature still lacks a comprehensive definition of corruption that may identify its 
―true‖  roots.  A  panel  cointegration  and  panel  data  analysis  suggests  that  corruption,  economic 
growth and democracy are neither jointly cointegrated nor explained linearly; there is a missing 
link. Finally, this research is constrained to ten South American countries and the years 1995-2008.  
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The analysis of corruption by international institutions has led to the impression that 
there is a consensus among scholars and incontrovertible evidence that corruption is ―bad.‖ 
It seems as if corruption became the escape goat for all the problems in democracies but as 
well in dictatorships. However, this emphatic conclusion is far from being reached. First, it 
is  yet  unclear  what  corruption  is,  what  causes  it  and  thus  the  consequent  policy 
recommendations. Second, some authors and institutions have contained this definition to 
the public sector, as if private actors where incorruptible. This seems to contribute only to 
the blame game by arguing that it‘s all the government‘s fault. This seems to be part of an 
agenda  of  promoting  smaller  governments  and  more  liberalization;  unfortunately,  this 
position has contributed to mislead policymakers and frame the debate as simply a matter 
of big government versus market freedom. 
 
Third, although there is a rich literature on corruption, the conduits explaining why it 
spurs  in  all  types  of  democracies  and  non-democracies  is  still  a  dilemma.  This  is 
particularly  troublesome  because  it  makes  policymakers  and  scholars  focus  on  the 
consequences of corruption but not its causes. Fourth, it is unclear if corruption promotes 
economic growth or not. This debate has not been settled and there is persuasive evidence 
from  both  sides.  Although  world  institutions  suggest  that  the  negative  relation  is 
undeniable,  diverse  counter  examples  prove  that  the  phenomenon  is  much  more 
complicated and has many more consequences than affecting economic growth.  
 
Finally, world international institutions seem to interpret corruption as a disease and 
not a symptom of the problems within each society. This has been done in an effort to 
reconcile the fact that dictatorships and democracies experience both high and low levels of 
corruption. Yet, this would be a contradiction to the neoliberal ideal that economic freedom 
fosters democracy. Furthermore, accepting this claim would be a direct attack on the claim 
that  decentralization  is  the  cure  of  all  problems  in  a  democracy.  Consequently,  some 
institutions argue that corruption is a problem of individuals and more permissive cultures. 
In  a  liberalized  and  free  democracy,  corruption  cannot  grow  unless  some  ―unaligned‖ 






However, the notion that corruption is ―bad‖ invalidates any argument that explains 
this phenomenon as a consequence of structural problems in society and not simply the lack 
of economic freedom or democracy. This debates excludes variables such as inequality, 
poverty  and  the  allocation  of  public  funds  in  a  ―legitimate‖  but  segregated  way  are 
excluded  from  this  debate.  These  factors  plus  institutions  and  discrimination  seem  are 
promising areas of research that may lead to the causes of corruption and thus effective 
policy  recommendations.  Nevertheless,  that  requires  approaching  corruption  from  a 
structural  perspective  and  as  a  symptom  of  society‘s  exclusion  and  lack  of  equitable 
development. Moreover, that requires an integral definition of democracy and participation 
as well; democracy and political freedom is more than voting or forming a political party; it 
is the right to do so, to have the means for it and not being excluded, no matter the political 
ideals or if they only represent a minority.   
 
This paper will analyze the literature on corruption and explore the South American 
case to provide evidence that corruption is not directly linked to economic and political 
freedom as defined and proposed by some institutions. This paper finds that there is an 
unclear empirical relation between corruption, democratic freedom and economic freedom. 
In order to arrive to this conclusion, data from Transparency International and the Freedom 
House  Organization  on  perception  of  corruption,  democratic  freedom  and  economic 
freedom, for the 1995-2008 period, is used. The econometric analysis is done through a 
panel data approach for ten countries in South America. The empirical findings indicate 
that there is a missing link between these variables. Furthermore, the analysis suggests that 
their  definitions  neither  capture  nor  explain  the  problem  in  depth.  Consequently,  more 
research that explores alternative conduits is required. 
 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section I provides a discussion on the diversity of 
definitions of corruption; the different types of corruption and the IMF‘s definition. Section 
II provides a review on the relation between economic growth and corruption. Section III 
analyzes some of the policies that foster more transparency, as discussed in the literature. 





economic  and  political  freedom  in  South  America  and  some  policy  recommendations. 
Finally, some concluding remarks are given.  
 
I. Corruption: What is it? Where does it come from? 
 
A. Definitions of Corruption 
 
Bayley (1966, p. 720) defines corruption as the misuse of authority for personal gain 
and not secluded to a monetary gain; any type of personal gain. Werlin (1973) simply puts 
it as the use of public resources for private activities. Klaveren (Kotkin and Sajo, 2002, p. 
151) when analyzing the Dutch East Indian Company, observed corruption as the action of 
a public servant that runs the public office as a private corporation. In that office, citizens 
would have to bargain and pay the official—an alleged CEO—for obtaining the favor from 
government. Klaveren was describing corruption as the abuse of public office for personal 
gains. In other words, power abuse driven by intentional and strategic activities (Lee-Chai 
et al., 2002, p. 45). 
 
In contrast, Johnston (2005, p. 8-9) argues that corruption is a consequence of the 
asymmetries of power and wealth that can arise from trading with the rest of the world. 
Johnston (2005) argues that corruption is created by the interaction of locals with outsiders 
that bring capital and wealth but with the objective of satisfying their personal gains. In a 
similar stance, Clinard (1990, p. 166) suggests that corporations may promote and tolerate 
corruption.   
 
Nevertheless, Lee-Chai et al. (2002), argue that power can also promote the good of 
society  and  not  only  corruption.  Two  examples  are  Nelson  Mandela‘s  fight  against 
apartheid and his social policies in South Africa (Arnold, 2000, pp. 45-46) and Abraham 
Lincoln‘s struggle to unite the United States and emancipate slavery (Halpern and Dal 
Lago,  2002,  p.  324;  and  Schneider,  2006).  Partly,  this  is  pointing  out  towards  Michel 
Foucault‘s (2003, pp. xvi, 67-69) idea that illusion is mixed with reality and our concepts 






In contrast, Rose-Ackerman (1978, p. 216) suggests that information and competition 
help  reduce  corruptive  actions.  She  also  states  however,  that  these  are  not  enough.  A 
thorough analysis of corruption is incomplete if the personal integrity of political actors is 
not included in the picture.  
 
Yet,  in  another  definition  of  corruption  that  encompasses  political  corruption, 
Heidenheimer et al. (1993, p. 6) defines corruption ―in terms of transactions between the 
private and the public sectors such that collective goods are illegitimately converted into 
private-regarding payoffs.‖ 
 
Nevertheless, several authors have divided the definition of corruption according to 
the magnitude at stake for society. Theodore Lowi describes Big Corruption and Little 
Corruption  (DeLeon,  1993,  p.19).  The  former  relates  to  those  illegal  behaviors  that 
―encourages  the  dissolution  of  the  constitution.‖  Whereas  the  latter  is  related  to  those 
actions that contribute to the depravation of individual moral integrity (ibid, p. 20). 
 
In  contrast,  Rose-Ackerman  (1999,  p.  47)  argues  that  corruption  arises  when  the 
government  establishes  rules  and  mechanisms  that  try  to  contain  market  forces.  This 
definition implicitly argues that the lack of resources and the pursuit for efficiency may 
encourage  corruption  (DeLeon,  1993,  p.  21).  Nonetheless,  Rose-Ackerman  (1999)  also 
explains  that  liberalization  must  come  hand  to  hand  with  political  reform  and  at  the 
beginning corruption may rise. Nevertheless, if political reforms are done properly they 
may reduce corruption in the long run. However, she points out that developed countries 
might not see these political reforms in their best interest since they believe that corruption 
allows their business to flourish in developing countries (ibid., p. 177).  
 
Finally, it is clear that the concept of corruption is under construction. Additionally, 
Warren (2004) concludes that the current definitions are troublesome because firstly, they 
charge with a moral stigma that points to individuals and not institutional causes of the 





pushing away other explanations and solutions for corruption. And, finally, the association 
between democracy and corruption is fuzzy. The lack of an encompassing definition also 
limits our possibility of finding viable and consistent policy recommendation to fight this 
problem.     
 
B. Types of Corruption 
 
Corruption can take multiple forms. Under political corruption, Gibbons (1999, pp. 
763-764)  mentions  nine  forms  of  corruption:  (1)  Political  patronage  or  using  public 
resources  to  reward  electoral  support.  (2)  Hiring  government  employees  that  favor  the 
ruler‘s political views or allocating contracts based on a partisan criterion. (3) Vote-buying. 
(4) Pork-barreling or promising public works to voters that the candidates know will not be 
able to deliver. (5) Bribery or citizens that pay an official to favor their interests. (6) Graft, 
when an official suggests he should be rewarded in order to comply with a public action. 
(7) Nepotism or hiring or allocating contracts based on kinship or friendship. (8) Influence-
peddling or inducing other public officials or an intermediary to perform a corrupt act. And 
(9),  corrupt  campaign  finance  or  receiving  funds  from  a  group  that  compromises  the 
electoral venue.  
 
Although  corruption,  politics  and  economics  are  intertwined,  from  an  economic 
perspective  some  forms  of  corruption  are  given  more  importance  than  others.  The 
following are the ―main‖ forms of corruption (Amundsen, 2000). 
 
Bribery, which is at the center of corruption and usually is what economic agents 
refer to as corruption. These kickbacks or payoffs are a fixed amount or a percentage of a 
contract that is given to a public official with the purpose of being favored in government 
contracts or speeding up bureaucratic processes. Bribery can be seen as a tax on firms and 
citizens,  reducing  the  incentives  to  invest  and  promoting  ―underground‖  channels  for 
avoiding the bureaucratic system. 





In contrast, embezzlement is the misappropriation of public resources by government 
officials. Nevertheless, this phenomenon is not restricted to the public arena. Private agents 
can also steal resources from private firms. This phenomenon curtails citizens of public 
investments and reduces the government maneuverability to satisfy public needs. 
 
Fraud is similar to embezzlement but differenced by including some form of deceit. 
This act is present in the private and public sectors. The accounting and fraud scandals of 
Enron in 2001 and WorldCom in 2002 are just two examples of fraud in the private sector. 
 
Another form of corruption is extortion. In contrast with the previous forms, this one 
is characterized by having a more violent component. In this case, criminals harass public 
officials or private agents for their personal benefits. The presence of Mafias or organized 
groups usually fit into this category. 
 
Finally, favoritism, a corrupt practice that is intended to provide certain groups or 
persons with more benefits than the rest of society in an unequal way. This last form of 
corruption is especially troublesome since it lowers efficiency by usually favoring those 
with the lowest quality products, the highest costs or the lack of expertise in performing a 
task for the public sector.    
 
C. The IMF’s view on Corruption 
 
Similarly, to the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund defines corruption as 
―the abuse of public authority or trust for private benefit.‖ This institution has a preventive 
approach on combating corruption. Furthermore, it seeks to narrow the scope for corruption 
in its member countries. However, narrowing corruption seems related to something other 
than corruption. It seems as is the IMF confuses corruption with the lack of free trade and 
free market oriented policies. This is clear when analyzing the causes of corruption. 
 
Mauro  (1997)  provides  seven  main  causes  for  corruption:  Trade  restrictions, 





for  civil  servants,  natural  resource  endowments  and  sociological  factors.  Indeed,  these 
causes are in accordance with Freidman‘s (2002) conception of the state. Nevertheless, 
these causes can be contradicted. First, for example, sociological factors are tied to ethno-
linguistic  fragmentation.  However,  Switzerland  has  four  official  languages  and  ethnic 
diversity and has one of the lowest corruption perception indexes in the world. Canada is 
another example. 
 
Second, Tunisia is an economy that is more open as a percentage of GDP than the 
United States, however, the U.S. has a lower corruption perception index than Tunisia. 
According to Transparency International, in 2007 Tunisia ranked 62 and the U.S. 28. Do 
trade restrictions necessarily foster corruption? Trade restrictions clearly do not encourage 
free trade but not necessarily corruption. Issuing import permits and using them as a source 
of  corruption  implies  that  foreigners  are  as  corrupt  as  local  authorities.  Consequently, 
reducing restriction at home will not lower corruption since the private sector from the 
exporting country is as corrupt as the local government. With no trade restrictions, they 
would just lure corruption to other parts of the government—or try to—through their rent 
seeking behavior. Maybe Mauro (1997) is implying prohibiting multinationals to export. 
 
Third, do natural resource endowments really promote corruption? Canada, Australia 
and  the  U.S.  are  endowed  with  more  natural  resources  than  countries  on  average; 
nevertheless, they have one of the lowest corruption indexes according to Transparency 
International. Although there are countries endowed with natural resources that are corrupt, 
the evidence seems to be inconclusive. 
 
Finally, multiple exchange rates might facilitate corruption but it does not seem like 
the cause of corruption. A floating exchange rate and bank accounts denominated in foreign 
currency may facilitate money laundering that encourages corruption. Furthermore, Hong 
Kong, Sweden and New Zealand have always ranked as low corrupted although they have 
transitioned  from  multiple  exchange  rates  to  floating  regimes.  Their  position  has  not 
worsen or improved consequently.   





II. Corruption and Economic Growth 
 
A. Corruption: The Grease that keeps the System Running 
 
Acemoglu and Verdier (1998) argue that a certain level of corruption can be optimal 
for  an  economy.  One  of  the  major  roles  of  the  state  is  enforcing  property  rights. 
Nonetheless, this can be costly and thus conducive to inefficiency since the allocation of 
these resources in other activities (education, health care) can render a higher social return. 
Consequently,  developing  economies  have  incentives  to  allow  for  corruption  since  this 
action is compatible with economic growth. 
 
Corruption arises because contracts  are incomplete. The relations between private 
actors  require  a  third  party  that  enforces  contracts  and  promotes  credibility.  The  state 
usually takes this stance. Indeed, corruption is a phenomenon that is not exclusively of the 
public sector. However, government officials may have incentives to use their power and 
profit from the enforcement of contracts.  
 
Yet, the tradeoffs with other activities, needs and sectors in the economy lead states 
to invest more resources in more than just combating corruption. The ―efficiency wages‖ 
approach suggests that higher wages for government officials prevents corruption since the 
cost  of  being  caught  taking  a  bribe  becomes  too  high.  However,  using  these  types  of 
solutions—high wages in the public sector—may attract skilled and talented workers that 
abandon their private ―low‖ paid jobs for the higher public pay. This creates inefficiencies 
that lead to losses in productivity of the economy and leads to slower economic growth 
(Acemoglu and Verdier, 1998). Once more, the public sector has incentives to allow some 
level of corruption to encourage efficiency and economic growth and keep talented workers 
in the fields in which they are most productive. 
 
In summary, Acempoglu and Verdier (1998) suggest that corruption is compatible 
with economic growth and thus may have a positive impact. For instance, Bayley (1966, p. 





countries. Accordingly, Kurer (2001, p. 66) shows that corruption is  abundant in developed 
countries. Italy is the example used in this study. Moreover, Kurer (2001) suggests that 
rapid growing economies like Thailand and Italy can tolerate corruption and still reach high 
levels of development.  
 
Kurer (2001) explains that there is a threshold for corruption not affecting economic 
growth, in fact it can be beneficial and promote development. In describing the Thai case, 
Kurer (2001) argues that corruption prevails in the rural parts of the country, which are the 
poorest.  However,  since  the  urban  areas  provide  the  majority  of  resources  for  the 
government they also request more public investments; leaving less for the rural areas. 
Consequently, corruption in the rural area acts as a conduit for the redistribution of income 
since more resources are made available to the rural areas, to which funds otherwise would 
have not been allocated. Since the productive areas—urban areas—are marginally affected, 
economic growth continues and promotes demand by increasing the poor‘s income—praise 
to corruption. 
 
Furthermore,  Lef  (1964)  and  Lui  (1985)  argue  that  corruption  can  have  positive 
impacts on growth but from a different perspective. These authors argue that corruption can 
work  as  a  means  for  overcoming  excessive  red  tape  and  government  bureaucracy. 
Consequently, the private sector can take less time to start-up a business, realize an export, 
or develop joint ventures with multinational companies that bring investment and economic 
growth. This constitutes the idea that corruption may act as the ―grease‖ that allows the 
engine to work smoothly. 
 
B. The “Corruption Tax” or Killing Economic Growth through Corruption 
 
In contrast with the ―grease the money‖ argument, Myrdal (1972, ch. 14) suggests 
that corruption acts as a deterrent for economic growth. The argument is as follows. Public 
officials have incentives to slower bureaucratic processes in order to obtain bribes. In other 





they can take advantage of economic agents and make them pay a bribe for speeding up a 
process that they have slowed purposely. 
 
Nevertheless, the literature points to three main counterarguments to corruption as a 
promoter of economic growth. The first one is the Myrdal argument just presented. Public 
officials, to capture private resources for their benefit, deliberately create the regulations 
that  slow  economic  ventures.  The  second  states  that  corruption  rarely  creates  any 
efficiency, since it is the rent-seekers and companies with the lowest quality products that 
use this mechanism. The third, corruption creates barriers to entry. Since public officials 
will favor certain firms, the others are left in disadvantage and sometimes without access to 
the market. Consequently, it deters competition, quality, low prices and efficiency (Fisher, 
2006, p. 138).    
 
Wei (2001) tries to establish if capital controls, taxes, and corruption have a negative 
effect on inward investment for a group of 14 major source countries and 45 host countries 
in 1991, including OECD members. The dependent variable is bilateral stocks of foreign 
investment. In the case of corruption, the author finds no evidence of ―efficient grease‖ on 
investment. This study points that corruption offsets investment. However, there are several 
methodological limitations with this study and error measurement bias that asks for caution 
when interpreting the results, as pointed out by Yeung (2001).  
 
In  accordance,  Tanzi  (1999)  suggests  that  the  most  efficient  firms  do  not  use 
corruption; on the contrary, the least efficient are also the most efficient at bribing and most 
corrupt.  Furthermore,  corruption  has  negative  impacts  on  the  tax  structure,  argues  this 
author.  Incentives  to  evade  taxation  are  increased  since  (1)  private  agents  see  the 
government  as  favoring  specific  groups  and  representing  the  general  interests  of 
entrepreneurs (loss of credibility) and (2) because corruption can be a signal of a weak 
government with low control over its territory  and low capacity to raise taxes (loss of 
legitimacy). Additionally, corruption can create extortions from public officials to citizens 
when  trying  to  raise  taxes,  thus  limiting  government  finances  (Hindriks,  et  al.,  1999; 






Moreover,  the  lack  of  financial  resources  for  the  state  limits  its  autonomy  and 
possibilities to encourage growth. 
 
Kaufmann  and  Wei  (1999)  analyze  the  relation  between  bribe  payments,  cost  of 
capital and management time wasted with bureaucrats in a cross-sectional framework. The 
authors use three surveys: the 1997Global Competitiveness Report containing 2,381 firms 
in 58 countries that answered to corruption related issues; the 1996 Global Competitiveness 
Report with 1,503 firms in 48 countries answering corruption related questions; and the 
1997 World Development Report with 3,866 firms in 70 countries.  
 
The findings by Kaufmann and Wei (1999) suggest that if bureaucratic complexity 
and red tape are exogenous, then corruption acts as the ―grease‖ that allows the money to 
flow and consequently may promote efficiency. However, if this process is endogenous as 
suggested by Myrdal (1972), then corruption does not foster efficiency. The authors also 
provide evidence that firms spend increasingly more time dealing with bureaucrats due to 
harassment (from bureaucrats). This finding rebuts the idea that corruption is exogenous 
and consequently that it can promote efficiency. 
 
Additional  empirical  studies  have  found  a  negative  relation  between  economic 
growth and corruption, for example, Mauro (1995) and Hines (1995).  
 
Rose-Ackermann (1975, 1998) also analyzes the relation between economic growth 
and corruption. She stresses the importance of institutions in mitigating the negative effects 
of corruption, especially in a context of global integration. In a similar note, but including 
the abundance of natural resources as the source of corruption, Leite and Weidmann (1999) 
explain  that  institutions  play  an  important  role  in  diminishing  the  growing  corruption 
because of the ―curse‖ of natural resources (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998; Collier, 2003). 
These authors argue that the abundance of natural resources creates incentives for rent-





solid  institutions  would  have  the  mechanisms  to  deter  such  incentives  and  exploit  the 
resources for the benefit of society (e.g. Alberta‘s oil sands, Canada).  
 
In contrast, Pessoa (2008), for a sample of 119 countries in the period 1980-2004, 
finds  a  negative  relation  between  institutional  quality  and  resource  abundance  for  all 
countries.  The  author uses  a panel  data  approach but  does  not  control for endogeneity 
between his proxy for institutions and economic growth. Several authors have pointed out 
that institutions are endogenous (North and Thomas, 1973; North, 1990; and Acemouglu et 
al., 2001), but the author of this study argues that assuming that they are endogenous limits 
the range of any policy recommendation (Pessoa, 2008, p. 11). His (ibid., p. 11) proxy for 
institutions is an economic freedom index constructed by Gwartney and Lawson (2003). 
Finally, his findings contradict the hypothesis that nations with poor institutions suffer from 
this ―curse‖ while those with consolidated institutions do not. This seems to imply that all 
countries are at risk when it comes to natural resource abundance. Thus, any country is 
susceptible to corruption from rent-seeking behavior in that sector. 
 
Following a similar argument, Uslaner (2008, p.25-26) argues that the contradictory 
results on the impact of institutions on corruption is due to narrow definition of democracy. 
Furthermore, this author explains that once equality as a form of democracy is incorporated 
in the equation, institutions do encourage less corruption. However, the author stresses that 
both mechanisms and not one as an isolated tool help promoting efficiency and economy 
growth.      
 
In contrast, Ali and Crane (2002) using a cross-section of 119 countries for the years 
1975-1989, find that economic freedom runs ―hand in hand‖ with institutional quality. This 
suggests that corruption can be contained through more economic liberalization. To obtain 
this result, the authors use the Economic Freedom Index developed by Gwartney, Lawson 
and  Block  (Ali  and  Crane,  2002,  p.  419)  and  published  by  the  Cato  Institute  and  the 
Freedom House indices on civil and political rights. 





Nevertheless, Ali and Crane (2002, p. 422) suggest ―the effect of economic freedom 
on growth is independent of the level of political freedom and civil liberty.‖ However, this 
conclusion  is  misleading  since  economic  freedom  is  related  to  political  freedom  and 
viceversa (Friedman and Friedman, 2002; Hayek, 2001, p. 15). Clearly, this point presents 
three important drawbacks in their study, specifically in their Table 3. First, their variables 
for  economic  freedom,  political  freedom  and  civil  freed  are  related  and  cause 
multicollinearity. This rests precision to their results. If there is no multicollinearity, as the 
author‘s suggest (p. 422), then there is a theoretical inconsistency.  
 
Second, there is endogeneity between real per capita GDP growth, and their political, 
economic and civil indexes. This is biasing their results and making OLS to be inconsistent. 
Again, assuming exogeneity is assuming that Friedman and Friedman (2002) and Hayek 
(2001) are wrong, but this would invalidate and contradict their results (Ali and Crain, 
2002, p. 425). This would be theoretically inconsistent. Finally, their regression analysis 
does  not  distinguish  the  channels  through  which  institutional  quality  interacts  with 
economic freedom  and  economic  growth.  This  is  particularly important if  you want  to 
explain corruption through the lack of institutional quality (Warren, 2004). 
 
Lastly, Ali and Crane (2002, p. 425) propose reductions in input price volatility as the 
channel trough which economic freedom affects growth. In addition, the authors suggest 
that  more  economic  freedom  implies  more  institutional  quality—thus  less  corruption. 
However, their estimations on price volatility do not control for supply and demand factors 
and  thus  suffer  omitted  variable  bias.  Finally,  their  ―hand  in  hand‖  relation  between 
institutional quality and economic freedom is contradicted by the data. Hasset (2007) shows 
that  politically  repressed  countries  on  average  grew  6.28%  in  the  years  1991-2005  in 
comparison  with  2.62%  from  politically  free.  Similarly,  the  theoretical  evidence  also 
suggests  that  dictatorships  may  grow  faster  and  may  have  higher  levels  of  investment 
(Durham, 1999; Overland and Simons, 2000).  
 
Similarly, Podobnik et al. (2008) conclude that countries with a higher Corruption 





Additionally, the authors suggest that richer countries are less corrupt (p. 548), for the 
period 1999-2004 and including all countries in the world. However, their estimations do 
not control for any other factors suffering from a serious omitted variables problem and 
hence inhibiting them to draw any feasible policy recommendation.  
 
Finally, Mauro (1998) suggest that corruption has a widespread effect in the economy 
not only affecting economic growth. This author argues that governments with high levels 
of  corruption  tend  to  spend  less  on  health  and education.  Although  Mauro  (1995)  and 
Kaufmann and Wei (1999) suggest that government regulation fosters corruption, it is yet 
unclear what is the conduit that leads to such phenomenon. Additionally, Myrdal (1972) 
would argue further in presenting a feedback loop between corruption and regulation. This 
evokes a more complex relation that is yet to be determined.  
 
In summary, there is a vast literature supporting the claim that corruption negatively 
affects economic growth. Nevertheless, these studies lack to explain if the effect is trough 
institutions or if democracy plays a major role in this process. When studies account for 
these effects, usually the results are not conclusive on the nature of the relation and thus the 
possible policy recommendations. Additionally, endogeneity problems are a constant with 
these types of studies since our knowledge of what causes growth is attributed to multiple 
factors (Sala-i-Martin, 1997), and yet the type, magnitude and channels of the feedback 
effects from the ―causes‖ of growth are still to be precisely determined.  
 
Additionally,  due  to  the  nature  of  the  data  and  the  difficulty  of  capturing  these 
concepts in a quantitative analysis, authors tend to replace these variables with proxies. 
Moreover, there is an important discussion on the relevance of these proxies and on the 
corruption indexes themselves. There are several measures of corruption each with its own 
methodology, sample and target group. Caution must be used when picking one (Sampford, 
2005). 
 
Finally, it seems fair to attribute the difficulty of establishing a solid relation between 





the concept. It seems, that corruption studies will follow a futile path until its relation to 
democracy and institutions is not well established (Warren, 2004). Furthermore, perhaps a 
critical  perspective  that  includes  power  relations,  inequality  and  class  struggle  would 
provide a more comprehensive picture on the nature of corruption (Girling, 1997, p. 167). 
Nonetheless, after doing so, quantifying and determining the relation of corruption with 
economic  growth  should  be  a  rewarding  endeavor  that  could  deliver  feasible  policy 
recommendations.     
 
III. Ways of fighting Corruption 
 
Some scholars and institutions have proposed the release of information as a means to 
combat corruption. However, there are several questions yet unresolved in the literature 
(Williams,  2009):  How  to  guarantee  that  the  information  released  is  accurate  and  not 
tainted by corruption? How can governments guarantee that the information released is not 
what corrupt officials want the public to see? Does greater transparency reduce corruption 
or do we need good institutions first in order to be transparent? 
 
Some scholars have argued that even for economic developed countries, transparency 
is not enough to fight corruption (Kolstad and Wiig, 2009). 
 
However, several scholars suggest that having public officials with high levels of 
education encourages more transparency and less corruption (Rauch and Evans, 2000). Yet, 
internal promotions and competitive salaries do not act as major factors in reducing the 
levels of corruption (ibid.) This finding is surprising since one of the main motives of 
corruption is economic gain (Becker and Stigler, 1974). Nevertheless, the high amounts of 
money involved in  a corrupt scheme might make any salary worthless as a weapon to 
combat corruption.  
 
This debate, related to institutional and governance effectiveness is not serendipitous. 
Mauro‘s (1995) findings suggest that corruption lowers investment and economic growth. 





strict monitoring, especially if enforced by an outside of government institution or branch 
(Klitgaard,  1988).  However,  there  are  three  major  drawbacks  to  this  proposal.  First,  it 
reduces national sovereignty. This creates inefficiencies in the bureaucratic system since 
institutions would seek the approval  of a third  party.  In fact,  the approval  itself might 
become the end of all institutions leaving aside the institution‘s original mission. 
 
A  second  criticism  is  that  outside  monitoring  is  expensive.  Finding  qualified 
professionals that understand the local and national context as well as the region‘s legal 
framework is hard. Especially, since you are looking for professionals or bureaucrats that 
are out of the system but know it as well as the bureaucrats in power. Additionally, larger 
governments  imply  more  financially  expensive  interventions  leading  to  a  cost-benefit 
analysis  that  might  suggest  a  tolerance  for  a  certain  level  of  corruption.  That  level  of 
corruption could be high if this underground activity is hard to detect or has become part of 
the culture. Indeed, this is troublesome. 
 
The third major debacle of monitoring is its lack of knowledge of the local culture 
and behavior. International institutions or third parties from outside the country generally 
execute  monitoring  in  order  to  avoid  political  pressures  and  manipulations—as  might 
happen with citizen organizations for monitoring governance. Yet these institutions might 
not understand or identify the behaviors that are considered corrupt in the regions they are 
monitoring; culture plays an important role in shaping corruption (Barr and Serra, 2006). 
For instance, Cameron et al. (2006) in an experiment with children from Australia, India, 
Indonesia and Singapore, show how conceptions and severity of punishments of corruption 
diverge  from  one  culture  and  country  to  another.  Cross-cultural  differences  affect 
corruption and economic outcomes (Hauk and Saez-Marti, 2002; Guiso et al., 2006).    
 
IV. Assessing Corruption, Economic Freedom and Political Freedom 
 
In order to assess the relation between corruption, economic growth and political 
freedom, this section will estimate this relation empirically. The first approach will use a 





if the theoretical underpinnings are reflected by the data, the estimations will include civil 
liberty, political freedom, economic freedom, government size, financial freedom and trade 
freedom,  as  pointed  out  by  the  literature.  If  corruption  is  actually  explained  by  these 
variables,  the  empirical  analysis  should  find  that  these  variables  are  significant  or 
cointegrated to corruption.  
 
The  next  section  provides  the  empirical  test  to  the  determinants  of  corruption, 
describes the methods and data used. 
 
A. The Data  
 
This paper analyzes 10 South American countries for 1995-2008, using data from the 
Heritage  Foundation  and  Freedom  House.  The  10  countries  included  in  this  study  are 
Argentina,  Bolivia,  Brazil,  Chile,  Colombia,  Ecuador,  Paraguay,  Peru,  Uruguay  and 
Venezuela.  
 
The dependent variable for this study is the Corruption Perception Index developed 
by Transparency International. This index is on a 0 to 10 scale, where 0 represents a very 
high perception of corruption and 10 a very low one. In this case, corruption is defined as 
―the misuse of entrusted power for private gain‖ (Transparency International, 2009).  
As  independent  variables,  this  study  includes  the  following  economic  freedom 
indexes developed also by the Heritage Foundation: Business Freedom, Trade Freedom, 
Fiscal Freedom, Government Size, Monetary Freedom and Investment Freedom. Each of 
these indexes is in a scale from 0 to 100, where 100 refers to the highest level of freedom.  
 
Also, a civil liberty and political rights index from Freedom House is also used. This 
index is in a 1 to 7 scale, where 1 represents a high level of civil liberty or political rights. 
The combination of these two indexes gives rise to a democracy index but in a different 
scale: 1 to 10, where 10 indicates the most democratic. These three indexes where used in 
the model specification but in excluding manners in order to avoid collinearity issues. 





The following table provides the correlations among some of the variables and their 
significance level.  
 
 
Table 1. South America: Correlations among Indexes, 1995-2008 
 














Corruption Index  1.0000     
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(0.0000)  1.0000 
 
Source: Own elaboration. Transparency International and Freedom House. 
Note: One asterisk (*) indicates significant at a 5% level; two asterisks (**) indicates significant at a 10% level. 
 
 
All  results  from  Table  1  are  significant  at  a  10%  level,  except  one.  The  lack  of 
correlation between the Business Freedom Index and Trade Freedom Index suggests that 
these two indexes may be effectively measuring different things. However, this result is 
surprising  since  the  Freedom  of  Trade  Index  and  Freedom  of  Business  Index  include 
common  factors;  for  example,  the  level  of  tariffs  and  non-tariff  barriers  that  may  be 
considered as factors that delay obtaining a license. 
 
Notice  that  the  Corruption  Index  provided  by  Transperancy  Internation  is 
significantly correlated to the Freedom from Corruption Index constructed by the Freedom 
House Foundation. This suggests that both indexes are measuring a similar phenomenon. 
Nevertheless, if their measures are biased, their correlation might be confirming that they 
are both biased. Regardless, it is probable that they are either describing corruption or a 
similar ―type‖ of corruption.    
 





B. Methodology and Results 
 
This  paper  follows  a  panel  data  analysis  for  the  relation  between  corruption, 
economic  freedom  and  political  freedom.  This  approach  is  preferred  to  a  cross-section 
equation since time series  data is  also  available. The presence of heterogeneity  among 
countries in the sample makes the cross-section equation misspecified. Although there are 
policies for economic integration in place throughout South America, economic, social and 
cultural differences prevail among countries. Furthermore, economic structures and income 
disparities are diverse throughout the region—compare Chile and Ecuador in terms of GDP 
per  capita  or  share  of  economic  sectors  respect  to  GDP,  for  example.  Furthermore, 
regarding corruption levels, I observe important heterogeneity among the countries in the 
sample (Table 2). 
 
Table 2. South America: Corruption Perception Index, 1995-2008. 
 
Country  Mean  Standard Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
Argentina  3.1       0.68          2.5          5.2 
Bolivia  2.6      0.45                   2.0  3.4 
Brazil  3.7      0.42          2.7          4.1 
Chile  7.2      0.44          6.1          7.9 
Colombia  3.4       0.62          2.2            4.0 
Ecuador  2.5      0.37                    2.0  3.2 
Paraguay  1.9      0.37          1.5          2.6 
Peru  4.0      0.47          3.3          4.5 
Uruguay  5.3      1.01          4.1          6.9 
Venezuela  2.4      0.28          1.9          2.8 
 
Source: Transparency International. Own calculations.  
Note: Does not include Guyana, Suriname and French Guiana. The Corruption Perception Index 
ranges from 0 to 10. A value of 10 indicates a very low perception of corruption. A value of 0 
implies a very high perception of corruption.  
 
 
However, I wish to capture unobservable heterogeneity that might be specific to each 
country  in  the  sample.  These  country  characteristics  are  invariant  through  time. 
Nevertheless,  they  have  on  impact  on  the  amount  of  trade,  size  of  government  and 
agglomeration. For example, geographic characteristics can increase transportation costs 
that  lead  to  less  trade  or  trade  at  more  expensive  prices.  The  countries  located  in  the 
Andean region of South America have a higher cost and cost structure than the countries 





and Panama—and the distance to the major cities is smaller than in case of the former—
with access to only one ocean or none, in some cases.  
 
Conventional theory suggests that these barriers to trade—although geographical—
can  limit  growth  and  foster  corruption  since  smuggling  or  contraband—a  form  of 
corruption—would be more difficult to control. 
 
Finally, the yearly evolution of corruption, civil liberties and political liberties should 
be  included  in  the  analysis  as  well—which  would  not  be  captured  in  a  cross-section 
analysis. In order to capture the cross-country heterogeneity, unobservable country specific 
heterogeneity  and  the  yearly  evolution  in  corruption  and  economic,  political  and  civil 
liberties, I use a panel regression approach. The model to estimate is as follows: 
 
CPIit = αi +β1Pollibit + β2Civillibit +  β3Govtit + β4Tradefit + β5Moneyfit +                           
+ β6Businessfit + β7Investfit + β8Financialfit + uit        (1) 
     
Where i = 1, 2,…,10, and identifies each country; t = 1995-2008, and represents the 
year  for  each  observation;  CPI  is  the  Corruption  Perception  Index  provided  by 
Transparency International—the freedom of corruption index from the Heritage Foundation 
was  also  used  in  the  analysis  with  similar  results.  Pollib  is  the  political  liberty  index. 
Civillib  is  the  civil  liberty  index.  Govt  is  an  index  for  the  size  of  government  in  the 
economy. Tradef is an index for the level of trade openness—or trade freedom. Moneyf is 
an index for the independence of the monetary authority or central bank. Businessf is an 
index for the level of bureaucracy and red tape when trying to start-up a business. Investf is 
an index for the level of bureaucracy involved when investing in the country. Financialf is 
an index for the easiness of capital flow.    
 
These  variables  are  causes  of  corruption,  according  to  the  corruption  literature 
(Section II). In the orthodox economic world, less economic liberty, including barriers to 
trade, capital mobility or excessive requirements for business start-up, should contribute to 
more  corruption  (Mauro,  1995,  1997  and  1998),  less  economic  growth  and  lately  less 
freedom  in  general  (Hayek,  2001;  Friedman  and  Friedman,  2002).  In  contrast,  several 





intervention is not necessarily bad, especially when it is providing health care, education or 
creating the institutions that account for development (Stiglitz et al., 2006; Stiglitz, 2006). 
Furthermore, Sachs (2005) argues that free trade does not necessarily promote economic 
growth and less corruption, when analyzed empirically.  
 
However, in order to proceed with the econometric estimation of Equation 1, a panel 
unit root test must be performed first, in order to rule out any spurious results. This paper 
uses the Levin Lin Chu (2002) test for panel unit roots. Since the number of years available 
is  only 14, this  test  outperforms  the  Im  et  al.  (2003) test.  Nevertheless, this  limitation 
obligates  the  Levin  Lin  Chu  test  to  assume  that  each  cross-section  unit  has  the  same 
autorregresive model of order one or AR(1). This means that all individual processes need 
to be stationary to accept the hypothesis of panel data stationarity. Since stationarity means 
that variances and means are constant in a data sample, requiring individual stationarity 
means that each country would need to have a constant variance and mean in order to be 
panel stationary.  
 
The Levin Lin Chu test follows an Augmented Dickey-Fuller framework but applied 










1               (2) 
 
Where Δyit is the differentiated version of variable y, which in this case is each of the 
variables involved in equation 1. X is a vector of seasonal dummies, for example. As in 
equation 1, i = 1,…,10 or the number of countries; and t = 1995-2008 or the number of 
years. Similarly, j would equal the number of lags in the test. Finally, vit represents the error 
term for this regression. 
 
Using the residuals from equation 2 to approximate Δyit and yit-1, and regressing these 
approximations,  α  can  be  obtained.  This  test  uses  a  modified  t-test  to  determine  the 
significance of α and verify if the null hypothesis of non-stationarity is rejected.      





Nevertheless, in order to verify the results of the Levin Lin Chu (2002) tests, I will 
also perform the Im Pesaran Shin (1997), Hadri (2000) and Fisher-DF (Maddala and Wu, 
1999) tests. The latter two tests have non-stationarity as their null hypothesis. In contrast, 
the Levin Lin Chu (2002) and Im Pesaran Shin (1997) have as null hypothesis that variable 
is stationary. 
 
The conclusion of the tests will be based on a majority rule, in order to obtain a 
robust inference. If three out of the four tests have the same result then that outcome will be 
the inference for that variable. The following table provides the results for all the panel unit 
root tests. 
 
Table 3. South America: Panel Unit Root Test, 1995-2008 
 
Variable  Levin Lin Chu  Im Pesaran Shin  Hadri  Fisher - DF  Inference 
Corruption Index  0.0007  0.2080  0.0000  0.0046  I(1) 
Freedom of Corruption  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  Inconclusive 
Business Freedom  0.0248  0.5430  0.0000  0.9746  Inconclusive 
Trade Freedom  0.0033  0.2890  0.0000  0.6928  Inconclusive 
Government Size  0.0450  0.3370  0.0018  0.0117  Inconclusive 
Civil Liberty  0.0000  0.0030  0.0001  0.3129  I(0) 
Political Liberty  0.0000  0.0440  0.0000  0.0639  Inconclusive 
Monetary Freedom  0.0003  0.4560  0.0000  0.9652  Inconclusive 
Investment Freedom  0.0053  0.6240  0.0000  0.9948  Inconclusive 
Financial Freedom  0.9096  0.9610  0.0000  0.9989  I(1) 
Democracy Index  0.0124  0.6360  0.0001  0.9441  Inconclusive 
 
Source: Own elaboration.  
Note: All tests include constant, trend and are set at one lag. Inference is the result of three or 
more  outcomes  with  the  same  finding.  The  Levin  Lin  Chu  and  Im  Pesaran  Shin  test  have 
stationarity as null hypothesis. In contrast, the Hadri and Fisher-DF have non-stationarity of the 
series as null hypothesis.  
 
The results provide evidence for no stationarity. Consequently, estimating equation 
(1) would return a spurious outcome and dubious findings. Yet there is another alternative. 
Since all variables are integrated of the same order, order 1, it might be possible to find a 
linear  combination  that  provides  a  stationary  and  non-spurious  output.  This  analysis  is 
called cointegration analysis. 
 
This paper uses Westrelund (2007) to test for panel cointegration. This test performs 
adequately  in  small  samples,  such  as  this  data  set,  and  with  more  power  than  other 





contrast with Pedroni (2004). The null hypothesis in Westerlund (2007) is that there is no 
cointegration. The results obtained using Persyn and Westerlund (2008) are presented in the 
following table. 
 
Table 4. South America: Panel Cointegration Tests, 1995-2008 
 
Covariate  Corruption Perception Index  Freedom from Corruption 
Gτ  Gα  Pτ  Pα  Gτ  Gα  Pτ  Pα 
Business Freedom (1)  0.640  0.280  0.340  0.320  0.040
*  0.260  0.030
*  0.110 
Trade freedom (2)  0.020
*  0.060










Political Liberty (4)  0.100
**  0.470  0.010





Monetary Freedom (5)  0.140  0.410  0.150  0.310  0.030
*  0.230  0.000
*  0.030
* 
Democracy Index (6)  0.100
**  0.250  0.130  0.300  0.080
**  0.130  0.010
*  0.060
** 





Multiple Covariates                 
1 and 4  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  0.000
*  1.000  0.173  0.999 
1 and 6  0.509  1.000  0.959  0.999  0.627  1.000  0.962  0.999 
2 and 4  0.000
*  1.000  0.000
*  0.998  0.000  1.000  0.000  0.990 
2, 3 and 4  0.825  1.000  --  1.000  1.000  --  1.000  1.000 
3 and 6  0.310  0.040
*  0.120  0.140  0.310  0.040
*  0.110  0.080
** 
3 and 7  0.710  0.300  0.900  0.650  0.030
*  0.280  0.000
*  0.050
* 
5 and 7  0.290  0.310  0.860  0.180  0.020
*  0.910  0.010
*  0.730 
6 and 7  0.340  0.550  0.820  0.800  0.370  0.110  0.830  0.460 
 
Source: Own elaboration.  
Note: Robust p-values. One asterisk (*) indicates significant at a 5%. Two asterisks (**) indicate 
significant at a 10%. All estimations include a constant and trend. 
 
For  the  Corruption  Perception  Index,  the  evidence  rejects  the  null  hypothesis  of 
cointegration in the majority of cases. If one uses as rule that 2 or more tests rejecting 
cointegration infers no cointegration for such a set of variables, one must conclude that 
there  is  no  clear  evidence  of  cointegration.  In  contrast,  when  using  the  Freedom  from 
Corruption Index, cointegration with one covariate is confirmed in almost all cases. This is 
not surprising since these indexes are all provided by the same source. Nevertheless, when 
other covariates are included to reduce omitted variable bias, cointegration is only found 
when Government Size and Financial Freedom are included.  
 
However, when using the Corruption Perception Index, which is highly correlated 
with the Freedom of Corruption Index, I find no evidence of cointegration. This suggests 
that there is an unclear relation among the variables included in the cointegration analysis, 
if any.  





Nevertheless, the unit root tests were not conclusive about the level of integration of 
the variables in this econometric exercise. This may suggest that the cointegration analysis 
is  misleading.  In  order  to  rule  out  this  possibility,  I  proceed  to  estimate  Equation  1 
assuming that they do not have a unit root. However, the Transparency Corruption Index 
cannot be used as a dependent variable because of its lack of stationarity (its test was 
conclusive).  Consequently,  the  Freedom  from  Corruption  index  will  be  used  as  the 
dependent variable in all estimations. 
 
The following table provides the results for the estimations. A fixed effect estimation 
is  the  most  adequate  procedure  since  there  are  unobservable  characteristics  among  the 
countries  that  do  not  change  or  remain  constant  during  1995-2008;  for  instance, 
geographical characteristics. Yet, a Hausman test is performed to assure that fixed effects is 
econometrically adequate.  In one case the Hausman tests  suggests random  effects  over 
fixed effects; in such case the random effects estimations are presented. 
 
Table 5. South America: Panel Data Estimations assuming Absence of Panel Unit Roots, 
1995-2008 
 
Independent Variables  Freedom from Corruption 
Fixed Effects  Fixed Effects  Random Effects  Fixed Effects  Fixed Effects 









































Civil Liberty  4.197 
(0.127)  --  --  --  -- 
Political Liberty  -3.323 
(0.006)  --  --  --  -- 







(0.175)  -- 







(0.954)  -- 
Democracy Index  --  0.478 
(0.271) 
0.533 
(0.242)  --  -- 
           
R-squared  0.0378  0.1291  0.1805  0.1035  0.1168 
Prob. > F  0.2305  0.0705  0.0000  0.0524  0.1110 
Hausman Test  0.0125  0.9948  0.0000  0.0616  0.0000 
 
Note: All regressions include temporal dummies and 140 observations. Robust p-values in parenthesis. One 






C. Discussion and Policy Recommendations 
 
The econometric analysis indicates that corruption—perception—, government size, 
free trade, financial freedom, and democracy have an unclear relationship. This finding cast 
doubts on the possible causation among these set of variables. However, this result must be 
interpreted cautiously. First, this analysis is constrained to 14 years. This time set might not 
be sufficient to capture any relation between these variables especially if these variables 
have a long term relation. 
 
Second, although the data presents sufficient variability to execute the econometric 
analysis,  the  1995-2008  period  may  not  provide  the  sufficient  historical  and  structural 
variability to capture the true relation among the variables. South America has had many 
dictatorships in the past, but the period of analysis is of ―relative‖ calmness. Although there 
have been political changes in terms of left wing or right wing parties coming into power, 
they have not been as radical as in the past. Additionally, their legacy may have effects only 
in the long term and the data may not be capturing this yet. 
Third, this study has analyzed a linear relationship among the variables. However, 
causation might be nonlinear in this case, as shown by Montinola and Jackman (2002) for a 
cross-country  analysis  where  dictatorships  may  have  low  levels  of  corruption  in 
comparison  with  partially  democratized  countries.  Additionally,  path  dependency  of 
corruption and the fact that institutions may evolve in a non-linear—unexpected—fashion 
may cast concerns about this result. For instance, the consolidation of political projects in 
this period that have historical roots and are only understood by analyzing the history of 
each  county,  do  not  allow  to  fit  any  classical  definition  of  liberty  or  corruption  and 
therefore not be captured by the indexes. 
 
Furthermore, corruption can be understood differently throughout  South  America; 
thus complicating comparison, especially with indexes based in perception from a diversity 
of  entrepreneurs.  Corruption  may  be  seen,  as  in  the  case  of  Thailand,  as  a  means  for 
redistributing income and public resources to those communities that have been abandoned 





these indexes—this  maybe inconceivable and not  justifiable. Consequently, the indexes 
may be biased and not capture the sufficient information to provide other results. 
 
However,  it  is  possible  that  the  relationship  is  unclear  because  there  are  other 
elements that work as conduits for fostering development—in an integral way, a la Amartya 
Sen—and eliminating corruption. Freedom means more than the possibility of voting for a 
candidate. Freedom is only complete if human basic needs are also satisfied and if society 
assigns more opportunities for those that are in the worst positions. Therefore, institutions, 
equality, human capabilities, values and culture might be the conduits that are lacking in the 
explanation of corruption and its possible solutions (Treisman, 2000). Nevertheless, it is not 
simply  a  matter  of  the  market  versus  regulation.  Indeed,  economic  variables  such  as 
inflation and GDP per capita should not be excluded from the analysis (Paldam, 2002).     
 
Finally, corruption is not a problem of higher salaries or more incentives for public 
officials. It goes beyond that realm and framing it in such a way is just a simplistic view. It 
is by no coincidence that the most corrupt free countries in the world are Scandinavian 
countries. Equality and the provision of health care, education and recreation as a right, 
provide the incentives for all members of society to avoid any corrupt behaviors (Jong-Sun 
and  Khagram,  2005).  Corruption  is  a  symptom  of  the  structural  problems  of  society. 
Undoubtedly, institutions play an important role in solving the real causes of a problem that 




Corruption is a term that is yet to be defined. Although several authors conceive of it 
as an improper use of private or public good for personal gains, this definition does not 
provide  a  clear  link  with  its  causes,  institutions  and  society.  This  has  limited  the 
possibilities of finding plausible structural solutions and establishing its true nature. 
 
Two major aspects have divided somewhat the literature on corruption. The first, 





This view gives corruption the conception of being a means for encouraging economic 
development. Some authors argue that corruption can serve as a channel for distributing 
income and public resources to those sectors of society that have been isolated by the 
economic and political structures. Others, however, suggest that corruption is a way of 
removing some of the red tape that slows economic growth and entrepreneurship. 
 
The  second  group  analyzes  corruption  as  a  ―tax‖  that  contributes  to  social 
inefficiencies and lately less economic growth. These authors indicate that corruption is an 
endogenous phenomenon that is self-reinforcing. Once it is there, it is very hard to remove. 
The basic explanation for corruption is that individuals are selfish and act as rent-seekers. 
Thus, increasing salaries  in  the public sector to provide fewer incentives  to  be corrupt 
worsens the problem by attracting talented individuals that at a ―normal‖ salary would be 
working in the private sector and producing more for society. Thus, corruption is a source 
for inefficiency. Additionally, if a citizen wishes to obtain a service from a private or public 
agent,  a bribe will be required. Thus, corruption imposes a higher price on goods  and 
services and this may be viewed in the form of a tax. 
 
The IMF also shares the idea that corruption is a ―tax‖ and detrimental to economic 
growth. This group‘s recommendations see corruption as a problem of society and not a 
symptom. Furthermore, they constrain the causes of corruption to excessive government, 
excessive regulation and barriers to trade and capital mobility, since this phenomenon is 
portrayed as a purely economic problem. 
 
This paper finds that corruption is much more than an economic problem. Moreover, 
when analyzing 10 South American countries in the 1995-2008 period, this study provides 
evidence challenging the notion that trade liberalization, capital liberalization and small 
government are the solutions to corruption. In fact, the data suggests that there are other 
channels that should be addressed in order to understand corruption and develop adequate 
policy solutions. Further research is required to indentify such channels. 





Finally, corruption should not be seen as a problem but a symptom of larger problems 
in society. Economic inequality, lack of opportunities, lack of freedom, and lack of the 
basic provision of goods for all members of society can be major sources for the spur of 
corruption. Consequently, corruption should be addressed in a comprehensive matter that 
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